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 ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY:
 TOWARD A RECONCILIATION?
 Metin Heper
 Turkey's democracy has been consolidated by the inclusion of the religiously-
 oriented into mainstream politics. This was facilitated by the increasing secular-
 ization of the Turks that made support for a radical religious revival less likely, and
 the increasing moderation of the worldviews of the religious groups themselves.
 7he Refah Partisi (Prosperity Party, RP)l obtained the plurality of votes in Turkey's
 December 1995 general elections. In June 1996, the RP and the center-right secular True
 Path Party (TPP) formed a coalition government, and the RP's leader, Necmettin Erbakan,
 became prime minister for the first two years of the coalition. These developments caused
 consternation among many in Turkey, but, unlike the situation in Algeria, the military did
 not lift a finger to prevent them. Everybody, including the military, accepted the
 legitimacy of a government led by Erbakan. How has this uneasy marriage between
 democracy and Islam in Turkey been possible?
 Metin Heper is the Dean of the School of Economic, Administrative and Social Sciences, Bilkent University
 Ankara, Turkey and afounding member of the Turkish Academy of Sciences. He is author of The State Tradition
 in Turkey and Historical Dictionary of Turkey. The author wishes to thank L. Carl Brown, Norman Itzkowitz,
 Aye Kadioglu, Atul Kohli, Bernard Lewis, Heath Lowry, serif Mardin and Rukhsana Siddiqui for their
 invaluable comments on earlier versions of this article.
 1. Refah Partisi is often translated into English as the "Welfare Party." As the party primarily aims to
 provide for the welfare of the people by increasing the overall wealth in the country as well as by a more just
 distribution of that wealth, the "Prosperity Party" rather than the "Welfare Party" seems to be a more accurate
 translation. In addition, in Turkish refah brings to mind first and foremost prosperity rather than welfare.
 MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL * VOLUME 51, NO. 1, WINTER 1997
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.198 on Mon, 30 Oct 2017 05:49:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY * 33
 In order to address this issue, we need to look at the relationship between Islam and
 democracy in Turkey from a historical perspective. Bernard Lewis has found some aspects
 of Islam incompatible with liberal democracy.2 Lewis has observed, however, that of the
 46 states which were members of the Islamic Conference in 1993, only one, the Turkish
 Republic, could be described as a democracy in Western terms.3 Earlier, Lewis had
 expressed a guarded optimism about the future of democracy in Turkey:
 Twice before, in the course of their history, the Turks have set an example and served as a
 model for others-under the Ottomans, of militant Islam; under Kemal Ataturk, of secular
 patriotism. If they succeed in their present endeavor to create, without loss of character and
 identity, a liberal economy, an open society, and a liberal democratic polity, they may once
 again serve as a model to many other peoples.4
 To use Juan J. Linz's terminology, in Turkey democracy has become the "only game
 in town;"'5 no group with political influence and/or power, including the military and a
 great majority of the religiously oriented groups, would prefer an authoritarian regime to
 a democracy.6 Islam, on the other hand, has been integrated into Turkey's democracy in
 a myriad ways, while constitutional and legal secularism have been kept intact. Religious
 orders, movements, and sects have had representatives in the secular political parties as
 well as in the RP. On the other hand, Turkey's 1982 constitution, not unlike the previous
 1961 constitution, stipulates that Turkey is a secular state and that this particular provision
 in the constitution cannot be repealed. The Constitutional Court can be activated by the
 president and by the political parties if these constitutional provisions are violated. In
 1971, for example, the Court banned the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party, NOP),
 also formed by Erbakan in the previous year, for using religion for political purposes.
 Ultimately, the military constitutes the major deterrent to the establishment of an Islamic
 state in Turkey.
 The consolidation of democracy in Turkey, including the successful inclusion of the
 religiously oriented groups, has been a consequence of an interactive relationship between
 Islam and democracy. In the 19th century, Islam was given short shrift as a source for
 public policymaking while some key ideas of democracy were allowed to flourish. From
 1923, when the Republic was founded, until the mid-1940s, democracy itself was
 gradually established. While people's religious feelings were respected, Islamists, defined
 here as those who wish to see Islam play a greater role in the society and/or the polity,
 were not permitted to have their own political organizations. From the mid-1940s to the
 present, as democracy became consolidated, Islamists have been increasingly reincorpo-
 rated into the political system. This was helped by a gradual change of attitude on the part
 of the bulk of the Islamists from an anti-regime stance to a pro-regime one.
 2. Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy," Atlantic 271 (February 1993), pp. 89-93.
 3. Ibid., p. 89.
 4. Bernard Lewis, "Modern Turkey Revisited," Humanities 2 (May/June 1990), p. 11.
 5. Juan J. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," Washington Quarterly 13, no. 3 (1990), p. 158.
 6. The point about the military's unwillingness to intervene once again draws upon the views of the last
 three chiefs of the general staff, reported in Metin Heper and Aylin Giiney, "The Military in the Third Turkish
 Republic," Armed Forces and Society 22 (Summer 1996), pp. 619-42.
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 THE IMPACT OF SECULARIZATION ON TURKISH IDENTITY, 1920s-90s
 The consolidation of democracy in Turkey and the gradual reincorporation of Islam
 into politics were facilitated by the increasing secularization of the Turks, after the
 establishment of the Republic in 1923, which made general support for a radical religious
 revival less likely. Even more critically, the increasing moderation of the worldviews of
 significant religious groups rendered those groups less of a threat to the secular democratic
 state.
 Reforms during the early decades of the Republic aimed at removing the pervasive
 hold of Islam on society and the polity.7 Some of the steps taken in this direction included
 the removal from the constitution, in 1929, of the provision that Islam was the religion of
 the state. From 1933 until the late 1940s, the courses on religion in primary schools were
 dropped. From 1934 to 1947, the haj, the Muslims' pilgrimage to Mecca, was prohibited.
 Western dress and headgear were adopted after 1925, and people were obliged to take
 surnames in 1934. Education was couched in the scientific terms of the West, and an
 alphabet of Latin origin was substituted for the one of Arabic origin after 1928. Sunday,
 instead of Friday, was made the day of rest in the mid-1920s. The lunar calendar was
 dropped, and the Gregorian calendar, which had been adopted in 1917 alongside the lunar
 calendar, became the only valid calendar in 1925. The Swiss civil law, the Italian penal
 law, and the German commercial law were adopted in 1926. Women began to vote in
 1930. By means of the mass media, education, flag saluting, national anthem singing, state
 parades and non-religious holidays on national anniversaries, attempts were made to
 socialize the people into becoming patriotic citizens of a secular republic rather than pious
 members of a Muslim community.
 These reforms had a strong impact upon the identity of the people. In the 1960s, to
 the structured survey question of "How do you see yourselves. .. " 50.3 percent of the
 workers in a textile factory responded that they saw themselves as "Turks" and 37.5
 percent as "Muslims."8 A nationwide survey carried out during the same decade, found
 that nationalism as a characteristic of the Turkish identity was stronger than religion.9 In
 a nationwide survey in 1994, 69 percent of those interviewed identified themselves as
 "Turks," 21 percent as "Muslim Turks," and four percent as "Muslims." Another four per
 cent said they were "Kurds," and the remaining two percent revealed other identities.'0
 The reforms in question also had a strong impact on the cognitive secularization of
 the people. In 1964, villagers no longer viewed a nearby town or even a city as "a
 7. Unless otherwise indicated, the following account of the secularist socialization of Turks draws
 mostly upon earlier studies by Metin Heper, such as "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern
 Perspective," The Middle East Journal 35, no. 3 (Summer 1981), pp. 350-58. See also Howard A. Reed,
 "Atatiirk's Secularizing Legacy and the Continuing Vitality of Islam in Republican Turkey," in Cyriac K.
 Pullapilly, ed., Islam in the Contemporary World (Notre Dame, Indiana: Cross Roads Press, 1980).
 8. Serif Mardin, Din ve Ideoloji (Religion and Ideology) (Ankara: Sevinc Matbaasi, 1969), p. 132.
 9. Frederick Frey, "Socialization to National Identification Among Turkish Peasants," Journal of
 Politics 30, no. 4 (1968), pp. 963-65.
 10. Reported in Milliyet (Istanbul), 2 February 1994.
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 conglomerate of humanity profaned by infidels."'1I A 1969 study found that, among the
 migrant employees at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, the frequency of
 religious practice was only weakly correlated with the belief that religion should not be
 separated from politics.'2 In a 1986 survey, only seven percent of a national sample
 approved of a statement that the country should be ruled by shari'a (Islamic law).'3 And
 in 1996, in Konya, one of the most religiously conservative cities in Turkey, an Islamic
 school that offered intensive religious instruction, together with an English-language
 curriculum, owed its popularity to its English-language instruction rather than to its
 teaching of Islam. The school received fewer applicants than the city's other foreign-
 language schools that did not offer religious instruction. '4 In the aftermath of the 1995
 national elections, a reporter from The Economist sent his magazine the following
 observation from Kayseri, a mid-Anatolian city: "From the ... RP people in the town hall,
 when you mention the praise for Iran recently uttered by Mr. Erbakan, all you get is a
 strained smile."'5
 ERBAKAN AND THE REFAH PARTY
 Erbakan and many of his associates are not clergymen, but have professional or
 business backgrounds. Erbakan is a professor of engineering. He is certainly not an
 Islamic thinker.'6 It is even claimed that Erbakan's and some of his close associates'
 knowledge of Islam leaves much to be desired.17 He has proven himself to be a perceptive
 politician, and understands the problems of the Turkish rural migrants in a society
 undergoing rapid change. Migrants to the cities have been subjected to the contemptuous
 behavior of the more sophisticated urbanites, they have lost their traditional sources of
 support and their sense of identity, and they have had to face major economic difficulties
 due in part to a nearly three digit rate of inflation since the 1970s.'8 Erbakan and his
 colleagues have offered a prescription for the ailments of the poor expressed in a religious
 idiom, Adil Diizen (Just Order). Yet, a 1994 survey indicated that only one-third of the
 RP's voters voted for the party primarily because it was an Islamic party.'9
 Mehmet Geyikdag, a Turkish scholar, has identified a significant characteristic of
 Turkish politics which helps to explain the RP's recent success at the polls:
 11. Peter Suzuki, "Encounters with Istanbul: Urban Peasants and Village Peasants," International
 Journal of Comparative Sociology 5, no. 2 (1964), p. 213.
 12. Ned Levine, "Value Orientations among Migrants in Ankara, Turkey: Case Study," Journal of Asian
 and African Studies 8, nos. 1-2 (1973), p. 58.
 13. Ilter Turan, "Religion and Political Culture in Turkey," in Richard Tapper, ed., Islam in Modern
 Turkey (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p. 55.
 14. New York Times, 16 January 1996.
 15. The Economist, 17 February 1996.
 16. Ru,en 1akir, Ne Seriat Ne Demokrasi: Refah Partisini Anlamak (Neither Shari'a Nor Democracy:
 To Understand the Prosperity Party) (Istanbul: Metis, 1994), pp. 127-28.
 17. Mumtaz'er Turkone, Modernle,sme, Laiklik ve Demokrasi (Modemization, Secularism and Democ-
 racy) (Ankara: Ark, 1994), pp. 3-4.
 18. Ali Ya,ar Saribay, Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam (Postmodernity, Civil Society and Islam)
 (Istanbul: Ileti?im, 1994), p. 207.
 19. Reported in Nokta (Istanbul), 26 June - 2 July 1994.
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 As far as the majority of people are concerned, they are inclined for the party that manipulates
 religion as long as they feel that the competing parties are the same in other respects. However,
 if a relatively secularist party looks more promising in the economic sphere, the majority of
 the voters are likely to vote for it rather than the less secularist party which manipulated
 religion but whose economic policy does not look promising to the voter.20
 In the 1995 national elections, the secular parties, including the ones on the left, did
 not offer the electorate well-thought-out and persuasive policy packages. To make things
 worse, the mainstream secular political parties were perceived as immersed in corrup-
 tion-in particular the TPP and the Motherland Party-or as engaged in endless
 squabbles-in particular the new Republican People's Party.2' Some members of the
 secularist intelligentsia were constantly engaged in de-legitimizing the political regime by
 trying to belittle such key institutions as the military, the National Security Council, the
 Council of Higher Education, the Presidency, and the Parliament, and this too played into
 the hands of Erbakan and his colleagues.
 It should also be noted that before the 1995 national elections, the RP essentially
 functioned not as a political party but as a social welfare agency for the needy.22 It
 obtained appointments for people at hospitals, and other public service agencies. Through
 the municipalities it controlled,23 the party also distributed coal, clothing, soup, and food
 to the needy.24
 On the eve of the 1995 elections, numerous party activists, at the grass-roots level,
 kept track of every voter deemed critical to the party's victory. They visited each voter
 before the elections, and, on election day, provided transportation to and from the polling
 stations for those who needed it.25 In its efforts to gamer votes, the RP was also supported
 by a complex network of Islamist economic ventures which included holding companies,
 chambers of commerce and industry, trade unions, women and youth groups, some 50
 publishers, 45 radio stations, 19 television channels, and hundreds of video and cassette
 producers.26 The RP mobilized all these groups and organizations, offered the electorate
 some moral and material support, and used its Islamist ideology to explain what was
 fundamentally wrong with the country.27 The ideology in question, however, did not offer
 well-thought-out measures to grapple with the ills the country faced.
 20. Mehmet Ya,ar Geyikdag, Political Parties in Turkey: The Role of Islam (New York: Praeger, 1984),
 p. 119.
 21. See Henri Barkey, "Turkey, Islamic Politics, and the Kurdish Question," World Policy Journal 13,
 no. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 45.
 22. Ali Bayramoglu, "Tahlillere Dikkat," (It is Necessary to be Careful about the Analyses Offered), Yeni
 Yiizyil (Istanbul), 4 January 1996.
 23. After the 1994 local elections, the RP controlled 28 provincial-level municipalities, eight of which
 were large metropolitan municipalities, including those of Istanbul and Ankara.
 24. 1akir, Ne $eriat Ne Demokrasi, p. 185.
 25. Interview with Professor Ersin Kalaycioglu, in Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), 8 November 1994. Also see,
 Barkey, "Turkey, Islamic Politics, and the Kurdish Question," p. 45.
 26. The numbers of publishers, radio stations, and television channels are as of January 1995. See
 Milliyet, 6 January 1995.
 27. Sencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party and the State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey," The Middle
 East Journal 50, no. 1 (Winter 1996), p. 52.
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 Since the mid- 1990s, the RP has attained political legitimacy and, in turn, has
 adopted the procedural rules of democracy, i.e. those designating the constitutional means
 of competing for and holding political office.28 The party has also adopted an increasingly
 more secular platform and political strategies aimed at expanding its political base of
 support. This new approach was the result of a strategic decision the party took in its
 Fourth Grand Congress, in October 1993, to open up the party to new groups in the
 electorate.29
 This decision was a victory for the so-called Yenilikqiler (innovators) in the RP led
 by Istanbul's metropolitan mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a likely successor to Erbakan.30
 Erdogan may be regarded as a 'republican Muslim.' While for years Erbakan has shunned
 the Republican Day ceremonies, Erdogan has taken part at those ceremonies in front of
 Ataturk's statue in Istanbul's Taksim square.3' Erdogan can also be considered a 'liberal
 Muslim.' Although, in the 1970s, the Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party,
 NSP)32 minister of interior, Oguzhan Asilturk, made serving alcoholic drinks in all
 restaurants conditional on obtaining a special permit,33 Erdogan recently commented on
 this issue as follows: ". . .because of our belief, we cannot serve alcoholic drinks in the
 restaurants run by our municipality. We cannot, however, prevent others from serving
 such drinks, even in those places they have rented from us."34 Erbakan once said that those
 who did not financially support the jihad (holy war) could not be considered true
 Muslims.3s Erdogan, on the other hand, observed: "The New Year is celebrated by the
 secularists and not by us.... I cannot, however, say to the secularists that they are not
 Muslims just because they celebrate the New Year. Only Allah is entitled to bring in a
 verdict on that matter."36 Finally, one can describe Erdogan as a 'democratic Muslim.' In
 the same interview he pointed out that in the theaters run by the municipality, plays were
 going to be staged that reflected "our own people's values."37 He was thereupon asked by
 the interviewer, "But are you not the mayor of all Istanbulites?"38 Erdogan responded
 rhetorically: "Am I not supposed to have my own beliefs and principles? Have I not been
 elected mayor because of those beliefs and principles? As an elected person, am I not
 obliged to respect the preferences of the people who cast their votes for me?"39
 28. Jeremy Salt, "Nationalism and the Rise of Muslim Sentiment in Turkey," Middle Eastern Studies 31,
 no. 1 (1995), pp. 13-25.
 29. 1akir, Ne 3eriat Ne Demokrasi, p. 120.
 30. Erbakan is not popular with the electorate, as a 1994 poll revealed: only one percent of the party's
 voters voted for the party because of Erbakan. See, inter alia, Nokta, 22-28 May 1994.
 31. Tempo (Istanbul), 18 January 1995.
 32. The NSP was established in October 1972 by Erbakan after his NOP was outlawed in May 1971
 because it was an Islamist party. The NSP was shut down by the military in October 1981.
 33. Ali Ya,ar Saribay, Tiirkiye'de Modernleme, Din ve Parti Politikasi: Milli Selamet Partisi Ornek
 Olayi (Modernity, Religion and Party Policy in Turkey: The Case of the National Salvation Party) (Istanbul:
 Alan Yayincilik, 1985), p. 190.
 34. Hiirriyet (Istanbul), 8 January 1995. Author's translation.
 35. Oktay Ek,i, "Erbakan Budur," (This is Erbakan), Hiirriyet, 21 July 1995.




This content downloaded from 139.179.72.198 on Mon, 30 Oct 2017 05:49:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 38 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
 The RP's Ankara metropolitan mayor, Melih Gok,ek, said in 1991, "If the majority
 of the people wish to live as Muslims you have no option but to allow them to lead such
 lives."40 This remark was made in response to the question, "Would you set up a state
 based on the shari'a?"'41 Two decades earlier, Erbakan, too, had pointed out that a Turkey
 where the shari'a was the primary source of law, was "theoretically possible" and that on
 this matter the Turkish parliament would be the judge.42
 Drawing upon these and similar statements, a student of Islam in Turkey, Ru?en
 fakir, concluded that RP members want a "theo-democracy," i.e. they wish to introduce
 theocracy through democratic means, although, that may be less than the full implemen-
 tation of the shari'a.43 According to fakir, the moderate Islamists long for a Muslim
 society but not for an Islamic state: they do not aim at a constitutional and legal
 de-secularization of the state.44 Earlier, Lewis, too, had predicted that "There is [in
 Turkey] little or no prospect of any restoration of Islamic law even in such basic matters
 as marriage or divorce."45
 THE RELIGIOUS BROTHERHOODS
 In the second half of the 1990s, the leaders of the influential religious brotherhoods,
 movements, and sects, and the leading Muslim intellectuals appear to be fairly well
 integrated into the Turkish secular democratic state and display even more moderate views
 than the RP. During the early decades of this century, there had been a tacit agreement
 between the leading religious brotherhoods, such as the Nak?ibendis and the Nurcus, and
 the secularist political parties that if the political parties left the religious brotherhoods
 alone, they would in turn give their political support to the parties. Later, the brotherhoods
 gradually took on a more activist role by acting as lobbies for the economic ventures
 established by Islamist groups in such sectors as textiles, construction and banking.46
 Consequently, the religious leaders of these brotherhoods, movements, and sects became
 symbolic heads, and the leadership cadres of those economic ventures became the laymen.
 Starting in the late 1960s, the brotherhoods began playing a significant role in the
 formation of political parties. The Nak,ibendis and Nurcus encouraged the establishment
 of the NOP and the NSP, respectively. The RP was founded with the consent of the shaykh
 (head) of the Nak?ibendi order, the late Mehmet Zahit Kotku. The Sufi orders competed
 for influence with center-right political parties, such as the Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)
 and the TPP. They supported the RP's view of secularism, but withdrew their support
 from the religiously oriented political parties when they concluded that these parties
 threatened the future of democracy in Turkey. Brotherhoods figured that the parties'
 frequent challenge of the Ataturkist state tradition could prompt a military intervention
 -M
 40. Yeni Yiizyil, 8 January 1991. Author's translation.
 41. 1akir, Ne feriat Ne Demokrasi, p. 124.
 42. Saribay, Turkiye'de Modernleme, Din ve Parti Politikasi, p. 11.
 43. 1akir, Ne 5eriat Ne Demokrasi, pp. 127-30.
 44. Ibid.
 45. Lewis, "Modem Turkey Revisited," p. 15.
 46. Ayata, "Patronage, Party, and the State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey," p. 45.
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 from which they would suffer most. For instance, several religious orders withdrew their
 support from the RP starting in the early 1990s, and even sent word to the National
 Security Council that they had terminated their link with that party.
 During recent decades, two Nak,ibendi shaykhs, Kotku and his successor, the present
 Shaykh Mahmud Esad Co?an, a professor of theology and the late Kotku's son-in-law,
 have disapproved of the fundamentalist interpretations of Islam by some radical
 brotherhoods. They have adopted an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary line on the
 Islamization of everyday life in Turkey.47 The Nak?ibendis do not view the state as their
 number one enemy.48 When Erbakan made one of his "imprudent" remarks such as the
 one about not supporting the jihad, Shaykh Kotku complained: "At this time we should go
 on teaching Islam in Turkey. What is this talk about jihad? In any case, jihad is waged
 against the infidel."49
 At one point, Shaykh Kotku gave the impression that he subscribed to theo-
 democracy; he stated that Islamists should give priority to reconstituting a Muslim
 community that "in time would inevitably lead to an Islamic state."50 Yet, as serif Mardin
 has argued, Kotku's choice of Shaykh Co?an as both his son-in-law and his successor,
 attests to his extraordinary sensitivity to modernity,5' which would not sit well with a
 theo-democracy.
 Next in importance to the Nak?ibendis has been the Nurcu movement led by Saidi
 Nursi. A Kurd, he led the Kurdish rebellions in Turkey that continued intermittently from
 1925 to 1938, while simultaneously preaching peace and stability in society and the polity.
 Early in his vocation, Nursi had a religio-modernistic goal: to save the students attending
 secular schools from atheism, and the students attending madrasas (religious seminaries)
 from fanaticism.52 According to Safa Miirsel, a leading figure in the Nurcu movement,
 Nursi always preached realism, scientific methodology, objectivity, and an evolutionary
 worldview.53 Nurcus came up with a rather sophisticated analysis of Islam,s4 promoted the
 idea of science above faith, and became receptive to republicanism and secularism.55
 Two groups emerged from the Nurcu movement. The first was the Yeni Asya (New
 Asia) group, which was established in the early 1960s and supported democracy. In 1990,
 it stopped supporting the center-right TPP, because it claimed that its leader, then Prime
 47. Ruqen gakir, Ayet ve Slogan (Verse and Ideology) (Istanbul: Meti, Yayinlari, 1990), p. 23.
 48. Ibid.
 49. $ahin Alpay, "Gorunmeyen Universite," (Unseen University), Milliyet, 11 November 1995. In Islam,
 jihad is also waged against the apostate.
 50. Saribay, Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam, p. 66.
 51. serif Mardin, "The Nak,ibendi Order in Turkish History," in Tapper, ed., Islam in Modern Turkey,
 p. 134.
 52. Cakir, Ayet ve Slogan, p. 78.
 53. Ibid., pp. 82-83.
 54. serif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediuzzaman Saidi Nursi
 (Albany: State University of New York, 1989).
 55. Paul Dumont, "Islam as a Factor of Change and Revival in Modem Turkey," in Sabri Akural, ed.,
 Turkic Culture: Continuity and Change (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Turkish Studies 6, 1987), pp.
 8-9.
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 Minister Demirel, who kept challenging the Ataturkian bureaucratic-military establish-
 ment, was a threat to democracy in Turkey.56
 The second and most prominent Nurcu group is the Fethullahcis. Its leader, Fethullah
 Giilen, a former civil servant, prayer leader and preacher, expressed some very liberal
 views in a newspaper interview in 1995:
 We do not support every government. But if someone has been elected to political office we
 should conduct ourselves toward that person as the people in the advanced Western countries
 do. In those countries, the people think that those occupying the highest governmental offices
 are the symbols of their countries' standing in the international community. This is, for
 instance, the case in the United States. The state is very important. Its absence creates
 anarchy.57
 Gulen also discussed democracy in his interview: "I have always urged the citizens
 who came to pray in my mosque, to vote in the elections. I have told them this is the duty
 of every citizen."'58 Gulen stated that social harmony was very important: "I do not wish
 to put on the spot some parliamentarians, bureaucrats, and the like who are otherwise good
 Muslims. Let us have sympathy for both the practicing and the non-practicing Muslims."59
 ISLAMIST INTELLECTUALS
 During the last two decades, a group of moderate Islamist intellectuals has risen to
 prominence. Many of these have had an extensive secular education, know one or two
 Western or Middle Eastern languages, have a fairly good knowledge of Western literature,
 philosophy and/or social history, and write in contemporary Turkish.60 They follow
 closely the trends in Western political thought,6' and live in major metropolitan centers
 such as Istanbul and Ankara. They keep in close contact with moderately secular
 intellectuals, with whom they have frequent public debates. Their newly acquired
 respectability, in the eyes of the moderate secular intelligentsia, contributes to their
 attracting a considerable audience among practicing Muslims.62
 These Islamist intellectuals have developed models of a pluralist Muslim community.
 One such model has been formulated by Ali Bulac, who, according to a 1993 survey, has
 a significant influence on the practicing Muslim university students in Turkey.63 Bula,
 56. 1akir, Ayet ve Slogan, pp. 92, 94.
 57. The following account of Gulen's views on different topics draws upon two extensive interviews
 published in Hlurriyet, 23-28 January 1995, and Sabah, 23-30 January 1995. Author's translation.
 58. Ibid.
 59. Ibid.
 60. Michael E. Meeker, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey," in Tapper, ed., Islam
 in Modern Turkey, pp. 190-92; and Binnaz Toprak, "Islamist Intellectuals: Revolt Against Industry and
 Technology," in Metin Heper, Ay?e Oncu, and Heinz Kramer, eds., Turkey and the West: Changing Political and
 Cultural Identities (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), p. 244.
 61. Nilufer G6le, Modern Mahrem: Medeniyet ve Ortunme (Forbidden Modem: Civilization and Veil)
 (Istanbul: Metis, 1991), p. 108.
 62. Meeker, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey," p. 189; and Toprak, "Islamist
 Intellectuals," p. 244.
 63. Reported in Nokta, 22-28 August 1993.
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 was influenced by the Medina Document, the seventh century agreement between the
 Prophet Muhammad and the Jews and polytheists in Mecca. Basing himself on that
 document, Bulaq has developed a model of a Muslim community in which different
 "social blocs" have "religious, cultural, and legal autonomy."64 Bulaq recognizes the fact
 that the Turks had an Ottoman empire in which different ethnic and sectarian groups were
 successfully accommodated. At the same time, he believes that the founders of the
 Republic were right in doing away with Turkey's Ottoman heritage because they cleared
 the way for a return to a pristine Islam. That form of Islam, according to Bulaq, is neither
 theocratic nor "totalitarian."
 Bulaq notes that in the Ottoman Empire and in Muslim countries the rulers chose to
 be "Allah's caliphs." In the process, they came to resemble the Catholic clergy, who
 monopolized the interpretation of God's will and who also adopted a hostile attitude
 towards those who did not profess allegiance to their faith.65 Bulaq points out that in
 pristine Islam, it is the religious community, rather than the clergy or the political
 leadership, that has the last word. In a Lockean fashion, the religious community
 designates the rulers, and makes a pact to obey them as long as they act within the tenets
 of Islam and in accordance with the preferences of the religious community. Furthermore,
 within the religious community, the individual has the right to interpret his religion,6 and
 therefore, according to Bulaq, should be free to decide how and even whether to practice
 it at all.
 Bulaq also underlines the need for harmony in society and the polity. He praises
 Sufism for having facilitated the transition from rural to urban life by providing migrants
 with a new identity. Bulaq believes that Islam could be instrumental in settling the Kurdish
 question, a view shared by the RP.67
 Islamist intellectuals have not, however, come up with a specific blueprint for the
 transformation of present-day Turkish society into the pluralist communities described in
 some of their utopian models. Like the leaders of the RP and the Islamist brotherhoods,
 movements, and sects, the Islamist intellectuals give priority to promoting an Islamic
 consciousness among the masses.68 They discuss the need to struggle in order to establish
 an Islamist order, but emphasize that the struggle is political.69 In any case, their
 worldviews can hardly be reconciled with that of an Islamic state.
 One of the prominent Islamist intellectuals, Rasim Ozdenoren, views Islam as a set
 of non-dogmatic beliefs and practices,70 and does not believe that a religious community
 can be created by resorting to force.71 Although he does not suggest that the West should
 64. Ali Bulac, Islam ve Demokrasi - Teokrasi, Totaliterizm (Islam and Democracy - Theocracy,
 Totalitarianism) (Istanbul: Beyan, 1993), p. 1 1.
 65. It is not clear from the text whether Bulac is referring to a particular period in time or to the Catholic
 clergy today.
 66. Bulac, Islam ve Demokrasi, pp. 96-97, 106-107, 109, 138, 164, 165.
 67. The interview with Bulac reported in Aktiiel (Istanbul), 3 March 1994.
 68. Toprak, "Islamist Intellectuals," p. 249.
 69. Ibid.
 70. Meeker, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey," p. 207.
 71. Rasim Ozdenoren, Yeniden Inanmak (Believing Again) (Istanbul: Nehir, 1986), p. 120.
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 be emulated, he nevertheless recognizes the West's achievements,72 and argues that a
 Muslim should not criticize the conduct of those who do not believe in Islam.73
 Another well-known Islamist intellectual, Ismet Ozel, does not approve of attributing
 absolute authority to the Quran and the hadith (Prophet's traditions) because "it makes one
 unable to reconcile oneself with the non-Islamic values of the society one lives in."74 Ozel
 admires Western civilization because it has been able to adapt to and absorb various
 worldviews,75 and has a high regard for the West because it has developed autonomous
 institutions that safeguard different cultural traditions.76
 SECULARISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE ISLAMISTS
 The radical secularists in Turkey view as "irrational" virtually any kind of
 preoccupation with Islam. They perceive Islam as the antonym of enlightenment, and have
 adopted a hostile attitude towards it. The day after the 1995 national elections, the lead
 editorial in Hiirriyet, one of Turkey's three national dailies, observed: "The Turkish
 electorate, with a four-fifths majority, made it clear that it wants to live in an Ataturkian
 Turkey and not in a world of perceived bigotry and fanaticism."77 As the radical
 secularists see a zero-sum relationship between secularism and Islam, they reject the idea
 of a reconciliation between the two. They refuse to enter into a dialogue with the Islamists
 and have a condescending attitude toward them. This attitude has contributed to the
 Islamists' occasional straying away from moderation, as when Erbakan made an
 off-the-cuff remark in April 1994 about "the religiously-oriented coming to power even by
 shedding blood if necessary."78
 Not only have the radical secularists in Turkey failed to realize the significance of
 Islam for the people-inter alia, as a source of belief, ethics, identity and/or consolation-
 but they have also exaggerated the Islamist threat to the Turkish secular democratic state.
 In Turkey, politics has become a functional alternative to religion: People with grievances
 have several means of articulating their demands and participating in politics. Further-
 more, Islamists are not facing a single party or dictator; they have to compete for power
 with secular political parties, the bulk of the intelligentsia, a great majority of the people
 who support constitutional and legal secularization, and, last but not least, the staunchly
 secular military.
 72. Ibid., p. 53.
 73. Ibid., p. 72.
 74. Ismet Ozel, UO Mesele: Teknik, Medeniyet, Yabancilalma (The Problem: Technique, Civilization
 and Alienation) (Istanbul: Dui,since, 1978), pp. 6-17.
 75. Ibid., p. 48.
 76. Ismet Ozel, Waldo Sen Neden Burada Degilsin? (Waldo, Why Are You Not Here?) (Istanbul: Risale,
 1988), p. 32.
 77. Hiurriyet, 25 December 1995. Author's translation.
 78. Hiirriyet, 4 April 1994. Author's translation. Needless to say, Erbakan's occasional forays into
 militancy cannot be attributed only to the radical secularists' provocative attitudes toward Islam in general and
 the RP in particular. Erbakan has a tendency sometimes to make outrageous remarks to satisfy the orthodox
 within the party and among the party's supporters.
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 Of the various so-called Islamist groups, only the radical Islamists oppose the secular
 democratic state in Turkey, and they constitute only a small minority among the Islamists.
 They also do not have a recognized charismatic leader who could be the Turkish, or Sunni,
 counterpart of Khomeini's Shi'ite velayat-i fakih (jurisconsult) who would interpret
 Allah's will. Furthermore, the radical Islamists are dispersed into a number of relatively
 marginal Islamist groups, such as the Giri,im (Enterprise) group, Buyuk Dogu (Grand
 East) group, Vahdet (Unity) group, and Hizbullahis (the party of God), which are not
 linked by any unifying central structure.79 Finally, the radical Islamists have not been able
 to develop their own indigenous Islamic ideology, but have had to draw upon the ideas of
 Islamist intellectuals in other countries. They consequently have become isolated from
 their own society.80 The Hizbullahis, for instance, basically adopted the Iranian Shi'ite
 model, although there is no comparable hierarchy of clergy in Sunni Turkey. When it
 became clear that the Iranian ayatollahs (clergymen) wanted to export a Shi'ite revolution
 to Turkey (and elsewhere), the Hizbullahis as Sunnis found themselves in an embarrassing
 situation and were marginalized as a radical Islamist group.81
 It is not, therefore, surprising that many of those who fear an Islamic revival in
 Turkey first think of the RP and not the radical Islamist groups. Yet, for a long time now,
 the RP members have been functioning within Turkey's democratic secular order. What
 they wish to change is the particular conception of secularism that the founders of the
 Republic instituted in Turkey's constitutions and laws-the separation of religion from
 politics and the control of religion by the state so that it would not develop retrogressively
 and challenge the secularist democratic principles upon which the Republic was
 established. The RP argues that, in true secularism, not only is the state autonomous from
 religion, but religion, too, is autonomous from the state. The RP points out, for example,
 that in a genuine democracy, the state cannot prevent female students from attending
 classes if they cover their heads in a Muslim manner. The RP wants the state to leave
 religion alone. It insists that the following paragraph of Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution
 be abrogated:
 Nobody can base even if partially the social, economic, political, and legal foundations of the
 state on religious norms and nobody can exploit or misuse religion, religious feelings, and the
 things considered sacred by religion for one's political or personal ends.
 In its stead the RP wants to add a new paragraph to Article 24 which would stipulate
 that all persons have the right to lead their lives in accordance with their own religious
 beliefs. At least in their public discourse, RP members do not challenge the secular
 premises of the state, but they point out that Article 24 as it now stands is in conflict with
 the freedom of conscience also guaranteed in Turkey's constitution.
 The radical secularists, comprising the majority of the intelligentsia, including a
 number of leading journalists, believe this stand on the part of the RP is a challenge to the
 79. gakir, Ayet ve Slogan, p. 290.
 80. Turkone, Modernle?sme, Laiklik ve Demokrasi, p. 9.
 81. 4akir, Ayet ve Slogan, p. 157. The Alevi minority in Turkey have opted for a secular regime as a
 means to guarantee their security against any Sunni repression against them.
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 secular premises of the state. They think that the RP is concealing its long-term intention
 of establishing an Islamic state in Turkey. When the now defunct NSP was a member of
 the coalition governments in the 1970s, it had indeed filled the positions in the ministries
 it controlled with its Islamist supporters. The radical secularists point to this as evidence
 of the Refahis' intention to set up an Islamic state in Turkey. Some have argued that the
 RP should be stopped, even by non-democratic means if this becomes absolutely
 necessary.
 In contrast, the moderate secularists, comprising many members of the center-right
 political parties and a minority within the intelligentsia, recognize the significance of
 religion for the people. They are aware of the dynamics behind the recent success of the
 RP at the polls, and they accept that the RP has the right to compete for political office and,
 if elected, to participate in a coalition government, or even to form a government alone.
 The thought of the latter eventuality, however, does make them rather nervous. Some
 among the moderate secularists, too, fear that further Islamization of the society and the
 polity may lead to the eventual establishment of an Islamic state in Turkey, and that
 the RP may be instrumental in such a development. Yet they tend to give the benefit of
 the doubt to the RP and refrain from assuming a hostile attitude toward it.
 The moderate secularists' tolerant stance toward the RP may contribute to the
 amelioration of relations between the secularists and the religiously-oriented and to
 greater flexibility on the part of the moderate Islamists. In fact, when the RP won a
 plurality of votes in the 1995 elections, Erbakan pointed out that he and his party would
 not make the mistakes they had committed in the past, and were prepared to play a
 constructive role in cooperation with other parties to solve Turkey's problems.82 He also
 moderated his stance on a number of issues stating, for instance, that he was not, in
 principle, against the Customs Union Agreement with the European Union, which he had
 earlier opposed.83 In the wake of the June 1996 RP-TPP coalition, the RP accepted the
 coalition protocol stating that the coalition government looked favorably upon a free
 market economy and the tariff union with the European Union,84 and supported the
 security forces against terrorism, as well as all of Turkey's international treaties, including
 the one with Israel.85
 CONCLUSION
 Looking at the extent to which democracy has been consolidated and Islam has
 become reincorporated into the social, economic and political fabric of Turkey in the
 1990s, one could make an optimistic prognosis about the relationship between democracy
 and Islam in that country. One might even argue that the interactive relationship between
 democracy and Islam has taken on a new and unexpected twist. Having long been
 subjected to the dominance of the radical secularists' perception of a zero-sum relation-
 82. Sabah, 27 December 1995; Yeni Yiizyil, 6 January 1996.
 83. Ibid.
 84. Yeni Yiizyil, 3 July 1996.
 85. Ibid.
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 ship between their worldview and Islam, the moderate Islamists, who champion the
 freedom of conscience, may now be instrumental in moving Turkish democracy in a more
 liberal direction. Their success in this regard may contribute to a softening of the hostile
 attitude of the radical secularists whose conception of democracy has often excluded not
 only the radical but also the moderate Islamists. The latter may now emerge as effective
 proponents of social harmony and consensus politics, not as the result of religious
 motivations, but because of pragmatic considerations of the situation that they find
 themselves in vis-a-vis the radical secularists. If the moderate Islamists only seek freedom
 of conscience and not constitutional and legal de-secularization, they could make a real
 contribution to Turkish democracy. The critical question is whether the moderate Islamists
 are interested in a theo-democracy, or in a liberal democracy, that is, a secular democratic
 state where freedom of conscience is safeguarded and both religion and the state are
 separate and autonomous.
 Erbakan and some members of the old guard within the RP as well as some members
 of the religious brotherhoods, movements, and sects have at times given the impression
 that they, indeed, had in mind a theo-democracy. It is likely, however, that their statements
 were made to appease the orthodox within their ranks, and perhaps also to make up for
 their lack of coherent and persuasive policies on substantive issues. One may assume that
 Erbakan and his colleagues, as well as the moderate Islamists, are shrewd enough to see
 that not only the revolutionary but also the evolutionary road to an Islamic state in Turkey
 is full of obstacles. It is difficult to imagine the moderate Islamists toying with the idea of
 revolution because they are so well integrated into the secular democratic state and
 economy, and function successfully in both spheres. Furthermore, the evolutionary path
 towards an Islamic state depends upon the Islamists' obtaining an electoral majority. In the
 mid-1990s, even when the Turkish economy was in shambles, when there were claims of
 widespread corruption within the secular political class, and when both the moderate
 center-left and center-right political parties had failed to come up with meaningful
 programs, four-fifths of the electorate still did not opt for the RP. If the secular center-left
 and the secular center-right had not been divided among themselves, the RP would have
 been a distant third in the 1995 national elections. Finally, only around seven percent of
 the voters who cast their votes for the RP in those elections, did so because the latter was
 a religiously oriented party.86
 A marriage between Islam and democracy in Turkey can be consummated if the
 radical secularists stop trying to impose their preferred life-style and set of values upon the
 Islamists, and if the latter do not attempt to undermine by word or deed the basic tenets
 of the secular democratic state in Turkey. A critical mediating role may be played by the
 moderate secularists whose numbers are on the increase. If these conditions obtain, and
 there is reason to think that they may, the Turks can indeed manage to achieve what Lewis
 thought they could: "a liberal economy, an open society, and a liberal democratic
 polity."87
 86. Reported in Nokta, 26 June -2 July 1994.
 87. Bernard Lewis, "Modem Turkey Revisited," p. 11.
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